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Over the past 30 years, transnational corporations (TNCs) have lobbied 
successfully for reductions in corporation taxes and increases in various tax 
concessions and benefits. On top of this, TNCs routinely engage in tax avoidance 
schemes that result in actual tax rates far lower than headline rates. According to 
the UK National Audit Office (NAO), 220 of the 700 largest firms in the UK paid 
no UK corporation tax at all in 2005/06, the period immediately preceding the 
global economic crisis (Comptroller and Auditor General 2007). And this refers 
only to ‘legal’ tax avoidance; it does not include illegal tax evasion. Such 
widespread tax manipulation sits uncomfortably alongside the huge levels of 
public assistance received by private companies in corporate welfare each year 
(see Farnsworth 2012). Tax evasion and avoidance undermine government 
revenues and the public policies that depend on them, and threaten the legitimacy 
of the entire tax system. But despite a degree of acquiescence, and even 
complicity, by many governments in corporate tax avoidance, a combination of 
political and economic factors is forcing corporate taxation up the political 
agenda. Against a backdrop of campaigns by unions and nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs; Americans for Tax Fairness undated; Canadians for Tax 
Fairness undated; UK Uncut undated), official investigations into the tax affairs of 
TNCs in the US and UK – including Apple, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Google, 
Amazon, and Starbucks – have provided a rare glimpse of the tax strategies of 
TNCs, as well as their power to shape tax rules and how they are interpreted 
(House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2012, 2013a, 2013b; 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 2012, 2013). These official 
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investigations form part of a broader political narrative precipitated by the high 
public financial costs of the economic crisis and the current ‘age of austerity’. By 
pulling together a wide range of pressing fiscal challenges, encompassing falling 
tax revenues, growing budget deficits, expanding public debt, the distribution of 
the tax burden between domestic and international capital, and corporate tax 
avoidance (Braunstein 2004; Center for American Progress undated; Garofalo 
2012; Gravelle 2011; McIntyre et al. 2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011; 
Schwartz 2013; Sullivan 2007; United States Government Accountability Office 
2013), this narrative has enhanced the opportunities for, and demands upon, 
policy makers to act, not just in the UK, but internationally, culminating, in July 
2013, with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD’s) attempt to co-ordinate action by nation states to tackle corporate tax 
avoidance (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013a). 
 The following discussion explores the tax practices which have given rise to 
this policy response and examines how contemporary trends in corporate tax 
planning, avoidance, and enforcement, undermine the capacity of modern tax 
systems to deliver effective public policies. The article draws on evidence given 
to the US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation (PSI; Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations undated) into corporate tax avoidance 
(Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 2012, 2013) and a similar official 
inquiry by the UK Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC) (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2012, 2013a, 2013b) and aims to situate 
TNCs’ strategies to minimise tax within a broader discussion of corporate power, 
the state’s ability to regulate TNCs, and the nature of corporate harm. 
 Throughout the article we use the term corporate tax avoidance, which, 
although commonly defined as efforts to minimise tax obligations that are 
contrary to the intentions of legislators (Murphy 2010), is riven with ambiguity. 
Although formally distinct from corporate tax evasion, which is illegal, the two 
overlap at the margins, separated ultimately by shifting, low visibility accounting 
practices, and their impact on government revenues is essentially the same. 
Moreover, as we argue below, there is increasing evidence to suggest that 
governments and tax authorities have intentionally sought to limit certain 
corporations’ tax liabilities to levels well below statutory and effective rates, as 
part of a global competition for business investment that creates incentives for 
governments to either ‘turn a blind eye’ or deliberately create environments where 
companies can avoid paying tax without censure. In terms of the conceptualisation 
of tax avoidance, such collusion with corporations in avoiding tax requires a 
distinction to be made between tax law, as it is made by legislators, and tax 
policy, as it is implemented. 
 The article is divided into three sections. The first section sets contemporary 
corporation tax policy within its political and economic context by outlining the 
effects of increased capital mobility on corporate tax rates. The second section 
outlines some of the key methods that corporations use to minimise their tax 
liabilities, explores the interdependencies between the demand for reduced tax 
liabilities and the professional infrastructure of tax planning and avoidance, and 
examines how the contemporary political economy of corporate taxation enhances 
the bargaining power of TNCs in the implementation of tax policy. In the final 
section and conclusion we discuss the implications of contemporary trends in 
corporation tax policy and avoidance for public policy and the study of social 
harm. 
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Contextualising Corporate Tax Avoidance 
 
Corporate tax rates have been falling steadily since the 1960s across most OECD 
countries (Swank 2002). In the UK, the main rate of corporation tax was 52% in 
1980, 34% in 1990, 30% in 2000, and 28% in 2010. In 2013 it was cut to 22% and 
it is due to be cut again to 20% by 2015.1 The drivers of this process have been a 
combination of corporate lobbying and structural pressures on successive 
governments eager to induce businesses to invest within their jurisdictions. 
Structural pressure arises from the fact that overall tax revenues, including taxes 
on general incomes and consumption, are ultimately raised on such investment 
and has its origins in the relaxation of capital and exchange controls and, in the 
case of European corporations, the intensification of economic integration in 
Europe, which has increased capital mobility. As a result, even companies that 
have fixed plant – and cannot easily relocate production elsewhere – have been 
able to shift their tax liabilities to jurisdictions with more favourable tax regimes. 
This has placed increasing pressure on governments to compete aggressively to 
both retain existing investment and attract new investment by reducing statutory 
rates of corporate taxation in a fiscally compromising game of beggar thy 
neighbour (Overesch and Rincke 2011).2 According to the US Congressional 
Research Service, the cut in the rate of US corporation tax from 48% to 35% 
between 1986 to 1988 by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was instrumental in the 
latest phase of this process, triggering a wave of corporate tax cuts around the 
world and creating a situation in which ‘none will gain capital, but all will lose 
revenue’ (Gravelle 2014, p.18). 
 In the UK, the drivers and effects of tax competition are illustrated by various 
initiatives aimed at encouraging new indigenous and foreign direct investment. In 
2001, for example, the then Labour government set out its stall, appealing directly 
to business leaders for new investment based on the tax and regulatory regime it 
had created: 
 
We have created a tax framework which encourages investment and enterprise by 
reducing the rate of corporation tax, making capital gains tax more pro-enterprise, 
introducing incentives for R&D and making permanent the capital allowances available 
to small firms. Taken overall, UK business taxation levels, including employers’ social 
security contributions and corporation tax, are competitive with the rest of the European 
Union. This is a situation we intend to maintain. (The Labour Party 2001) 
 
More recently, the coalition government’s commitment to ‘creating the most 
competitive corporate tax regime in the G20’ (HM Treasury 2013) has coincided 
with, and is helping to exacerbate, a new fiscal crisis – with continuing falls in 
corporation tax revenues alongside an expanding deficit. 
 Tax competition has intensified as a result of a significant growth in Offshore 
Financial Centres (OFCs) which help facilitate the market for tax planning and set 
the context for weak systems of enforcement and government complicity in tax 
avoidance. OFCs are low-tax countries or jurisdictions that offer financial services 
to non-residents on a scale incommensurate with the size of their domestic 
economies (Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux 2010; Picciotto 1999). Non-residents 
pay little or no tax and there is little transparency either within the country or 
outside it (Monetary and Capital Markets Department and the Legal Department 
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2008). In 2010, there were around 70 OFCs worldwide (Christensen and Murphy 
2004; Farquet 2012; Monetary and Capital Markets Department and the Legal 
Department 2008; Smith 2013). According to research carried out by the United 
Nations Centre for Trade and Development, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
flows to OFCs are at a historically high level, having risen rapidly since 2007 
following the start of the financial crisis (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Investment 2013).3 OFC economies now account for a non-negligible and 
increasing share of global FDI flows, at about 6% (Monetary and Capital Markets 
Department and the Legal Department 2008; Murphy 2008). Added to this, an 
increasing number of non-OFC countries (such as Austria, Portugal, Hungary, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands) are beginning to behave like OFCs, through the 
use of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Investment 2013). Hungary, Luxembourg and the Netherlands reported more than 
US$600 billion in investment flows to SPEs for 2011 (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Investment 2013), redirecting financial flows to third countries in 
order to avoid tax. 
 The use of OFCs by TNCs is significant. One survey estimated that 99% of 
European quoted companies have operations in tax havens (Tax Justice Network 
2009), whilst a recent US study found that 82 of the top 100 publicly-traded US 
companies were operating subsidiaries in OFCs in 2012, helping them to avoid 
paying an estimated US$90 billion in federal taxes each year (Smith 2013). OFCs 
provide TNCs with incentives (because of the low tax rates in tax havens) and 
opportunities (because of the secrecy provisions tax havens offer) to shift 
incomes. It is normal in OFCs for little or no tax to be charged on transactions so 
long as they have, or can be deemed to have, taken place elsewhere (Murphy 
2008).4 
 A vast range of tax benefits – also used to induce corporate investment and 
other ‘desirable’ business activities (Klassen and Laplante 2012; Sahadi 2013) – 
increase the opportunities for tax avoidance and help to expand the gap between 
statutory and effective tax rates (Citizens for Tax Justice 2013). An examination 
of OECD data reveals that the tax breaks offered to businesses in the late 2000s 
were annually worth around 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the UK and 
around 4.5% in the US (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2009). The schemes offered by governments can be hugely 
profitable. Companies can write off capital investment against tax and make use 
of ‘accelerated depreciation’ schemes which typically allow the company to write 
off their entire investment in the first few years, much more quickly than the 
actual time taken for the asset to wear out. Indeed, governments often incentivise 
companies to invest by allowing them to write off more than 100% of the costs of 
new investment (McIntyre and Gardner 2014). The scope of tax breaks also tends 
to be widely drawn. In the US, for example, the domestic productions activities 
deduction allows companies to deduct 9% of the cost of qualified manufacturing 
expenses from their income tax (Internal Revenue Service 2013). In practice, the 
deduction extends to processing and preparation of food products for sale at 
wholesale, which includes grinding coffee and making hamburgers (Karnis 2010), 
and although eligibility for the deduction is limited to manufacturing that occurs 
‘substantially’ in the US, the threshold is set at 20%. Thus, whilst governments 
compete on headline rates of corporate taxation, an elaborate system of tax breaks 
when combined with tax avoidance, results in tax rates that are far lower than 
statutory rates. Although estimates vary (Bartlett 2013; Citizens for Tax Justice 
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2012), research by the US Government Accountability Office suggests that 
profitable US corporations paid an effective federal tax rate of 12.6% in 20105 
(United States Government Accountability Office 2013), compared with a 
statutory rate of 35%.6 In the UK, a TUC commissioned report found that the 700 
largest corporations in the UK had an effective tax rate 7.5% lower than the 
statutory rate (30% at the time) (Murphy 2008). 
 
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Enforcement 
 
Although the details of TNCs’ efforts to reduce their tax liabilities can be quite 
complex, the underlying strategy is simple: TNCs design their businesses to locate 
as much income as possible in countries where taxes are low and as many costs as 
possible in jurisdictions where the statutory tax rate is high (Schjelderup et al. 
2009). Although some techniques skilfully produce this effect by exploiting 
differences between tax residency rules,7 most stem from the system used to 
allocate profits to countries. TNCs produce separate accounts for each country in 
which they operate and set the prices associated with intragroup transactions that 
happen across tax borders, which provide a basis for determining where profits 
and costs are booked. This is important because multiple filings in multiple 
countries reduces transparency and prevents national tax authorities from being 
able to verify the accuracy of tax returns made by TNCs. But whilst a lack of 
cross-national co-operation between tax authorities makes existing tax agreements 
difficult to enforce (Directorate-General Taxation and Customs Union 2013), 
evidence given to the PAC suggests that the rules themselves are widely defined 
and open to interpretation, and, therefore, play a key role in facilitating avoidance. 
The OECD’s guidance on transfer pricing, which involves one part of a company 
within lower-tax regimes securing and ‘selling’ goods at inflated prices to other 
parts of the company in higher-tax regimes, thus reducing profits and tax 
liabilities in the latter, clearly stipulates that profits should be taxed where genuine 
economic activity is carried out (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2010). However, what constitutes a genuine site of economic 
activity is often difficult to determine, especially where companies have managed 
to divorce the distribution and sale of goods from their production, which is tied 
to the ‘brand’ and/or intellectual property that resides in the product. The key here 
is that the ‘economic activity’ linked to the brand or intellectual property could be 
sited anywhere, far away from the sale of particular goods and services. In this 
way, Starbucks can claim that a great deal of the economic activity associated 
with the sale of its coffee stems from its R&D activities in the US and its coffee 
processing enterprise in Switzerland, where it buys raw beans, and the 
Netherlands, where its roasting plant is located. Coffee purchases from the 
Netherlands are levied at a premium of 20%, whilst revenue generated in British 
stores is subject to a 6% charge in royalty payments.8 Similarly, Google can claim 
that its product depends on its R&D activities in California, whilst Amazon can 
claim that the technology, infrastructure and organisation residing in Luxembourg 
is what matters in the delivery of its products, rather than the warehouses in the 
UK that are argued to function primarily as distribution centres. However, as the 
PAC pointed out, the company employed 134 staff in Luxembourg, but 2,266 in 
the UK, and whilst it generated an estimated £122.8 million of profit in the UK in 
2010, and just £2.2 million in Luxembourg, it located most of its tax liabilities in 
Luxembourg where the rates are lower (House of Commons Committee of Public 
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Accounts 2012). By the time companies have allocated part of their turnover to 
pay royalties, or repay loans at inflated prices to their parent companies, not to 
mention written off various tax deductibles, there may be little or no profit left in 
a subsidiary on which to declare and pay corporation tax. Starbucks, for instance, 
has been able to report accounting losses in all but one of the 15 years in which it 
has traded in the UK. 
 Creativity in the interpretation of tax rules appears to be embedded in the 
institutional processes used to develop them. As the PAC pointed out, large 
accountancy firms second staff to the Treasury to provide advice on formulating 
tax legislation so that when they return to their firms, they have inside knowledge 
of how to identify loopholes in new legislation and advise their clients on how to 
take advantage of them (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
2013a). Other evidence indicates that firms’ ability to interpret tax rules creatively 
reflects the imbalance of resources between accountancy firms and tax authorities. 
The returns involved in avoiding tax are considerable. Sikka (2012) cites one 
example involving the US telecommunications company WorldCom, which 
involved a return of between 1,000% and 3,800% on capital invested in a scheme 
organised by KPMG. According to a 2003 PSI report, returns such as these have 
led TNCs to invest ‘substantial resources’ on ‘forming alliances, and developing 
the internal and external infrastructure necessary to design, market, and 
implement hundreds of complex tax shelters’ (US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations 2003, p.18). In 2009, the four major accountancy 
firms alone employed nearly 9,000 people and earned £2 billion in the UK and as 
much as US$25 billion globally from their tax work; an estimated 50% of their 
fees now come from ‘commercial tax planning’ and ‘artificial avoidance schemes’ 
(Tax Gap Reporting Team 2009a). The substantial imbalance of resources 
between the private tax avoidance industry and tax authorities caused by this rapid 
development in professional expertise (Sikka 2003) was highlighted by the PAC 
which reported that there are now around four times as many staff working for the 
accountancy firms on transfer pricing alone as there are staff working for the UK 
tax authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC; House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts 2013a, p.3). According to Everson (2011), the 
Commissioner of the US Inland Revenue Service between 2003 and 2007, this 
creates the professional space for creativity to thrive as tax professionals are 
encouraged to ignore disclosure rules in the knowledge that tax authorities are 
unlikely to discover the underlying transactions, particularly where penalties can 
readily be absorbed as an operating cost. The outcome, according to the House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2013b) is that: 
 
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) appears to be fighting a battle it cannot win in 
tackling tax avoidance. Companies can devote considerable resource to ensure that they 
minimise their tax liability. There is a large market for advising companies on how to 
take advantage of international tax law, and on the tax implications of different global 
structures. (p.3)  
 
In addition, resource disparities constitute an important driver of co-operative 
enforcement practices which create an enabling context for both creativity in tax 
accounting and avoidance. Even where companies are accused of having paid less 
tax than HMRC think is legally due, the outcome is more likely to be a negotiated 
settlement than legal action. Tax policy, in this context, is reduced to a negotiation 
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between the company and the state characterised by marked inequalities in 
bargaining power that derive from contrasting resource capabilities, organisational 
pressures, and objectives. In contrast to companies which can make substantial 
gains from challenging tax authorities’ interpretation of their liabilities, tax 
authorities must not only work within limited budgets, but also be sensitive to 
government policy in using tax regimes to create a pro-business environment. 
This is built into the criteria used to determine whether the value of settlements 
are reasonable, which includes a consideration of ‘whether the settlement was as 
good as, or better than, the outcome that might be expected from litigation, 
considering the risks, uncertainties, costs and timescale of litigation’ (Comptroller 
and Auditor General 2012, footnote 134). A legal challenge brought against 
HMRC into the circumstances leading to one of these settlements with the US 
investment bank Goldman Sachs, provides a rare insight into the extra-legal levers 
which TNCs can use to exploit this process. Goldman Sachs was accused of 
privately negotiating a reduction of £10 million on a total interest payment bill of 
£40 million. The interest charges were due on its outstanding tax liabilities which 
arose because the company was found to have engaged in illegal tax avoidance 
practices in the 1990s. In negotiations over its tax liabilities with HMRC, 
Goldman Sachs ‘threatened to withdraw’ from a banking code of practice which 
would, according to the Permanent Secretary for Tax at HMRC at the time, have 
been highly embarrassing for the Chancellor of the Exchequer and HMRC. A 
further problem is that such cases are conducted in private. The former Head of 
HMRC in particular was criticised as having ‘an unduly cosy relationship with 
large companies it is trying to settle tax disputes with’ and of having ‘had a 
significant number of lunches and dinners with companies, tax lawyers and tax 
advisers – as many as 107 such engagements in two years’ (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts 2012, p.16). 
 The weaknesses inherent in co-operative approaches to collecting corporate tax 
are also illustrated by the so-called Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes 
(DOTAS). Under DOTAS, companies engaging in tax avoidance disclose their 
avoidance activities to HMRC who, in turn, rule on their legality. If legal, the tax 
avoidance scheme can be utilised for financial gain until such a time as HMRC 
acts to close the loophole that facilitated it. At that point, companies will move on 
to the next scheme. The net effect is a permissive environment for accounting 
innovation, which stretches tax practices and rules to their limits (Hanlon 1994; 
Sikka 2008, 2012). Although some schemes have subsequently been closed down 
since the introduction of DOTAS, the UK NAO stated that it has had little impact 
on the use of aggressive schemes, largely because HMRC lacks the necessary 
resources to take effective pre-emptive measures (National Audit Office 2012). A 
recent NAO report on DOTAS estimated the total ‘risk’ (or cost in lost revenues) 
associated with the 41,000 open cases in March 2012, to be in the region of £35 
billion (although some of this amount is associated with individuals rather than 
corporations) (Comptroller and Auditor General 2012). 
 Arguably, the key significance of the relative under-resourcing of HMRC is 
that it illustrates the relatively low political priority given to collecting tax revenue 
from corporations. In 2012, HMRC reported that it had 1,200 staff overseeing 783 
large businesses, in respect of which £25 billion in tax was potentially 
outstanding; this contrasted with 2,876 staff at the Department of Work and 
Pensions examining allegations of fraud worth £1.2 billion against benefit 
claimants (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2012; Syal 2012). 
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Moreover, it is important to understand that it is not just companies that 
governments are doing battle with over taxation, it is also other states. The US PSI 
investigation into the tax affairs of Apple, for instance, found that, for many years, 
Ireland has provided Apple affiliates with a special tax rate substantially below its 
already low statutory rate of 12%. Apple told the subcommittee that it had 
obtained this special rate through negotiations with the Irish government. 
Answering questions on the alleged deal with Apple at a European Union (EU) 
summit on banking secrecy, Irish Prime Minister, Enda Kenny, denied the 
existence of ‘special’ deals with key corporations and claimed that the Irish 
government would continue to compete for international business using a 
‘transparent’ tax regime (Anon 2013a). According to Apple, this special corporate 
income tax rate had been 2% or less since 2003 (Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations 2013).  Starbucks has also apparently reached a similar ‘secret’ 
deal with the Netherlands. When asked by the chair of the PAC for details of the 
tax rate paid by Starbucks in the Netherlands, the company’s representative 
replied: 
 
I am very happy to provide that to the Committee, but I am bound by confidentially to the 
Dutch Government on that. . . . The tax authority, under our Dutch ruling, has asked us 
not to share that publicly. (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2012, 
response to Question 246) 
 
Such evidence of bespoke tax deals reached between corporations and 
governments throws into question the very sustainability of the corporate tax 
system and raises serious questions about the alignment of government and 
corporate interests and its effects on tax revenues and public spending in future. It 
also raises questions about what lengths governments will have to go to in future 
to entice companies to invest and suggests that international agreement on 
corporate tax competition may be further away than is presently thought. There is 
growing evidence that differences in statutory rates within the EU has led to a 
substantial redistribution of corporate tax revenues from relatively high to 
relatively low corporate tax regimes (Huizinga and Laeven 2008). 
 
 
Social and Economic Costs of Corporate Tax Abuse 
 
The following section outlines the major social and economic costs associated 
with tax abuse, beginning with tax avoidance. 
 There is a dearth of accurate and consistent data on the costs of avoidance. 
Low standards of transparency in corporate financial reporting, differences in 
what should be included in estimates, and disagreements over the meaning of tax 
avoidance have produced varying estimates (Miller 2013). The UK government 
estimates that the corporation tax gap – the difference between the amount of tax 
expected and the actual amount paid – amounted to £4.1 billion in 2010/11 (the 
most recent estimation year available) (HM Revenue and Customs 2012, Table 
1.3, Qq 13–15). A highly-regarded tax justice advocate in the UK, Richard 
Murphy, suggests that a more accurate estimate for the corporate tax gap is around 
£12 billion (Murphy 2008, 2012). When we consider the significant tax gaps that 
apply to individual companies, a figure closer to Murphy’s does not look 
unreasonable. In 2012, for instance, Amazon earned £6 billion in sales in the UK, 
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yet paid only £517,000 in corporation tax, whilst in 2013, Google paid £11.6 
million in UK corporation tax on UK revenues of £3.4 billion: £770 million less 
than it would have paid if it had paid tax at the full rate of 23% in 2013 (Rankin, 
O’Carroll and Monaghan 2013). Aggregate measures for the sums involved in 
different forms of avoidance also provide intuitive support for Murphy’s higher 
figure. One widely-cited estimate of the misuse of transfer pricing suggests that, 
in 2004, between 45% and 60% of all international transactions related to the sale 
of goods and services involved manipulated prices, at a cost of US$365 billion 
(Baker 2005). Inaccurate pricing in these transactions was calculated to account 
for 10–11% of their value, indicating that that transfer pricing alone accounted for 
5–7% of world trade (Baker 2005). 
 The social impact of such large losses to government revenues is highly 
significant, especially during times of fiscal crisis. Avoidance, coupled with 
policy measures that countenance only reductions in corporation tax, redistributes 
the tax burden elsewhere, including onto lower income citizens. It also 
undermines the sustainability of public policies, including the kinds of 
infrastructure projects and investment in education, health care and pensions that 
are essential either to satisfy corporate needs or reduce corporate harms of various 
kinds (for a discussion of harm see Hillyard et al. (2004); Hillyard and Tombs 
(2007)). This makes for a tense and contradictory policy environment, where 
public policies, including tax policies, operate in the interests of corporations that, 
in turn, utilise every mechanism to reduce their tax burden. As the chief executive 
officer of Google put it, after coming under heavy criticism for its own tax 
avoidance strategies: 
 
I am very proud of the structure that we set up. We did it based on the incentives 
that the governments offered us to operate . . . It’s called capitalism. We are 
proudly capitalistic. I’m not confused about this. (Kumar and Wright 2012) 
 
In addition, the infrastructure of avoidance helps to produce economic instability. 
OFCs and the global flow of unregulated capital was a major cause of the post-
2007 economic crisis. Tax havens helped fuel the volume of international capital 
flows and the search for high-risk returns which were not only instrumental in 
creating the 2007 crisis in the first place, but also helped to spread contagion 
around the globe. They also encouraged companies, including banks, to divert 
their own capital to tax havens, with the result that they became excessively 
leveraged, with huge and unsustainable levels of debt and to conceal their losses 
(Shaxson 2010). 
 Third, aggressive tax competition undertaken by governments risks creating 
imbalances in the economy. Relatively high concentrations of highly-mobile 
capital within countries increases the pressure on those countries to continue to 
compete effectively to retain companies that have few physical and even fewer 
‘emotional’ ties to a country. As already discussed above, all governments face 
real tensions in trying to police and clamp down on tax avoidance, whatever their 
ideological and political leanings. Recent UK policy, under both Labour and the 
Conservatives, has been driven more by a desire to placate businesses and induce 
higher rates of investment in an increasingly competitive global environment. 
Because of this, governments have been slow to move. The post-1997 Labour 
government promised a clampdown as soon as it came to power. Plans drafted in 
1997 for a ‘general anti-avoidance rule’ (GAAR) were eventually shelved in 
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favour of a review into the issues. The ‘Hartnett review’, established in 2001, 
sought to redefine the relationship between government and business as one of 
‘mutual trust’ on the matter of taxation and other regulations. The Labour Party 
was keen to prove that it, rather than the Conservatives, was the natural ally of 
business. The Hartnett review promised ‘a new, faster process’ for dealing with 
corporate tax disputes which would focus ‘only on the most important issues’ and 
would foster a ‘collaborative approach’. The new approach was cemented through 
a new large corporate forum and a business tax forum (Tax Gap Reporting Team 
2009b). This strategy, like the coalition government’s after it, was born, in part, 
out of the realisation that existing mechanisms for raising corporation tax and 
enforcing tax law were failing. 
 Fourth, studies suggesting that the major TNCs report significantly lower 
taxable income compared with domestic-controlled corporations illustrate the 
competitive advantages that TNCs gain over nationally based companies, by 
shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions and by having access to the largest funds 
necessary to make use of the most lucrative tax avoidance schemes (Collins, 
Kemsley and Shackelford 1997). The impact on their (national) competitors, and 
ultimately consumers, can be huge, placing TNCs in a better position to compete 
for new markets or take over competitors in higher-tax countries (Anon 2013b; 
Desai and Hines 2004), and, over a relatively short period of time, lead to market 
dominance. 
 Fifth, there is a risk that systematic tax avoidance by one group delegitimises 
the whole tax system. Coupled with this is growing disquiet amongst domestic 
companies that find it more difficult to take advantage of international methods of 
tax avoidance. The result is falling revenues generally, which further undermines 
public services. Lastly, but probably most importantly, corporate tax avoidance, 
and tax competition, undermine state revenues and public policies. This is 
especially true at this time of austerity amid draconian cuts to social welfare 
expenditure that are having their greatest impact on the poor. Making up the gap 
between public revenues and expenditure by shifting taxes onto immobile capital 
or citizens may only make matters worse. And the current tax debate, in part 
shaped by private business interests, is intolerant of income taxes, with the 
consequence that the most regressive forms of taxation which impact most heavily 
on lower incomes, namely consumption taxes, are the ones that are most likely to 
be used to fill any gaps in revenues. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Corporate tax abuse is a growing problem with wide-ranging social and economic 
costs, especially in the context of the recent global financial crisis. Transnational 
corporations employ increasingly sophisticated methods that are designed to 
reduce their tax bill. Some do so through the adoption of illegal tax evasion 
methods. But others do so through the employment of relatively innocuous-
sounding methods of ‘tax efficiency’. Together, both methods bring huge costs in 
terms of lost tax revenues. But it is the latter that is especially problematic, 
precisely because it is interpreted by many TNCs as simply part of the modern 
way of doing business. 
 There is nothing surprising about the fact that corporations should seek to 
minimise their tax bill. What is more surprising and worrying is the extent of the 
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problem and the fact that governments also appear to be colluding in the practice. 
The battle ground is no longer between corporations and governments, but 
between governments and governments, each one keen to attract new private 
sector investment with increasingly attractive inducements to companies to 
facilitate such investment. TNCs, in the context of relatively permissive national 
tax environments may be excused for thinking that such permissiveness is simply 
part of the overall package of inducements. Certainly, the evidence provided in 
this article suggests that such collusion on the part of governments in tax 
avoidance is par for the course. 
 Although the direction of political debate may be shifting, it is by no means 
clear that governments are any closer to being able to tackle corporate tax abuse. 
On the other hand, the fact that official inquiries have been carried out into the tax 
affairs of some of the largest and most powerful transnational corporations, and 
that these companies have been heavily condemned by elected officials and the 
mainstream media, is a positive, but unusual, step in the right direction. The 
OECD is also seeking to put in place tighter international frameworks that would 
make it harder for companies to dodge tax, although the details have yet to be 
ironed out. The costs of the financial crisis, a significant part of which was 
associated with bailing out private banks, has encouraged some within politics to 
question the continued legitimacy of systematic tax avoidance. The kind of 
complex financial arrangements which help companies to avoid tax, to some 
extent mirror the kind of practices which led to the post-2007/08 financial crash in 
the first place and, for governments staring at increasingly large fiscal holes, there 
is less willingness to allow business to continue as usual. The result of this has 
been high-profile inquiries into corporate taxation in the UK and the US, followed 
by more concerted efforts at the international level to co-ordinate action to tackle 
tax abuse. The UK and US investigations alone have had far-reaching 
consequences in that they have provided rare glimpses into the otherwise highly-
secretive world of corporate tax planning practices. What is immediately clear 
from the evidence provided to the official inquiries carried out in the UK and US 
is that tax abuse is far more sophisticated, and has far greater potential negative 
implications for public policies than the social science literature has, perhaps, 
given credit for. Corporations have proven themselves to be more mobile (at least 
when it comes to declaring profits), more capable (in terms of protecting their 
own narrow corporate interests), less responsible (at least in terms of ignoring the 
consequences of their actions), and more duplicitous (in demanding more from the 
state at the same time that they appear to be less willing to pay for the state) than 
many would have imagined. 
 The net result of this is that, for those opposed to corporate tax abuse, there are 
currently reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic. The moves at the 
international level to tackle tax abuse, coupled with growing disquiet within 
mainstream political debate concerning systematic tax avoidance, on the back of 
the financial crisis, may lead to measures that will more effectively tackle the 
problem. At the same time, however, the UK government has opposed such 
moves on the basis that they may undermine the strength of the City of London. 
Unless there is concerted international governmental reform to tackle corporate 
tax abuse, it is clear that the problem of corporate tax avoidance will likely 
intensify and become more harmful over time. 
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Notes 
 
1 For recent trends in other jurisdictions, see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (2013b). 
2 One recent study estimated that, in the absence of tax competition, the mean statutory 
tax rate of Western European countries in 2006 would have been about 12.5 percentage 
points above its actual level (Overesch and Rincke 2011). 
3 The average annual FDI inflows to OFCs in the period 2007 to 2012 were US$75 
billion, well above the US$15 billion average of the pre-2007 period (2000 to 2006) 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment 2013). 
4 One analysis of financial and ownership data of more than 1,500 TNCs operating in 
India found that in 2010, TNCs with links to OFCs reported 1.5% less profits. They paid 
17.4% less in taxes per unit of asset and 30.3% less in taxes per unit of profit than TNCs 
with no such links (Janský and Prats 2013). 
5 The figure relates to profitable US corporations that filed a Schedule M-3 and 
represents the percentage of tax paid on pre-tax worldwide income reported in their 
financial statements (for those entities included in their tax returns). When foreign and 
state and local income taxes are included, the figure increases to around 17% (United 
States Government Accountability Office 2013). 
6 The federal rate on the largest US corporations is 35%. State and local governments 
may also impose income taxes. Corporations are permitted to deduct state and local 
income taxes when calculating their federal taxable income, generally resulting in a net 
rate of approximately 40% (KPMG undated). 
7 For example, Apple has been able to minimise most of its tax liabilities on offshore 
earnings of US$102 billion by structuring three Irish subsidiaries to be tax residents of 
neither the US – where they are managed and controlled – nor Ireland – where they are 
incorporated. Ireland uses a management and control test to determine tax residency, 
while the US determines tax residency based upon a company’s place of formation. In its 
evidence to the PSI, Apple explained that although one of its subsidiaries, AOI, was 
incorporated in Ireland, it was not tax resident there because it was neither managed nor 
controlled in Ireland. It also maintained that, because AOI was not incorporated in the 
US, it was not a US tax resident under US law either (Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations 2013). 
8 Starbucks was also found to use several accounting methods to limit its tax liabilities to 
just £8.6 million on £3.1 billion in sales over a 13-year period. Amongst other things it 
was found to utilise inter-company loans, imposing relatively high levels of interest, 
which effectively diverts what would otherwise be profit into debt repayments to the 
holding company. Starbucks UK paid group companies £2 million in interest in 2011. 
Starbucks typically charges its subsidiaries 4% above the Libor (London Interbank 
Offered Rate) in interest. As a comparison, KFC charges its subsidiaries around the Libor 
plus 2%, whilst the UK units of McDonald’s pay affiliates interest at or below the Libor 
(Bergin 2012). 
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